This paper studies the implications of in ‡ation persistence (generated by backward-looking 
Introduction
How should monetary policy be conducted in a New Keynesian model in which prices are sticky at multiple stages of production ? Huang and Liu (2005) and Strum (2009) examine this question using a forward-looking New Keynesian "input-output" model-a model that has sticky prices in both the intermediate and …nal goods sectors. They …nd that a central bank paying attention to price movements in both the …nal and intermediate goods sectors can more ably minimize household utility losses than if it considers only one sector. Furthermore, Strum (2009) …nds that if the central bank acts under discretion, it performs better if it targets price levels rather than in ‡ation rates.
One feature of the standard forward-looking New Keynesian framework is that it generates Phillips curves that do not relate current in ‡ation to lagged in ‡ation. Yet studies such as Fuhrer (1997) , Rudebusch (2002) , and Roberts (2005) …nd an important empirical role for lagged in ‡ation in the Phillips curve. Besides a¤ecting the speci…cation of the Phillips curve, in ‡ation persistence can a¤ect the evaluation of monetary policy in New Keynesian models. For example, when examining discretionary monetary policy regimes in one-sector New Keynesian models, Walsh (2003) and Nessén and Vestin (2005) show that the type of regime that performs best depends on the degree of in ‡ation persistence in the Phillips curve.
These …ndings suggest the question: How is monetary policy design in a New Keynesian inputoutput model a¤ected by in ‡ation persistence? To answer this question, the standard model must be extended so that the Phillips curve exhibits in ‡ation persistence. As recent scholarship has found, in ‡ation persistence can arise in New Keynesian models in a number of di¤erent ways. 1 This paper builds in ‡ation persistence into the input-output model developed by Huang and Liu (2005) and extended in Strum (2009) by following the approach pioneered in Galí and Gertler (1999) , Amato and Laubach (2003) , and Steinsson (2003) : When resetting prices, some …rms are modeled as employing a simple rule of thumb that uses information about past states of the world to set new prices. These …rms may behave this way if, from time to time, they …nd it too costly to gather new information and calculate the optimal forward-looking price. Firms using this rule of thumb generate in ‡ation persistence in the sectoral Phillips curves. Furthermore, compared to models with sticky prices in one sector, this model can yield di¤erent degrees of in ‡ation persistence in di¤erent sectors. This paper examines four questions about monetary policy in New Keynesian models: How does in ‡ation persistence at multiple stages of production a¤ect the conduct of optimal policy under commitment? How does in ‡ation persistence at multiple stages of production a¤ect the type of loss function that should be assigned to a central bank acting under discretion? How well do di¤erent regimes perform when policies are set using incorrect assumptions about in ‡ation persistence or the sources of shocks? How well do policies derived from one-sector models perform when implemented in an input-output model?
I …nd that the timing and magnitude of the central bank's responses to shocks when implementing optimal monetary policy under commitment are a¤ected not only by the presence of in ‡ation persistence, but also by the relative degrees of sectoral in ‡ation persistence. On the other hand, the nature of the central bank's responses-whether expansionary or contractionary-is not a¤ected by the degrees of in ‡ation persistence.
When studying monetary policy under discretion, I …nd that in ‡ation persistence a¤ects the type of loss function that best minimizes household losses. As in Strum (2009) , price-level targeting performs best in a forward-looking model. However, when in ‡ation persistence is introduced, speed-limit targeting (a regime targeting the change in the output gap) performs best. Price-level targeting outperforms in ‡ation targeting unless in ‡ation persistence is high in both sectors.
When a regime is chosen and the loss function is crafted, the government may make an incorrect assessment of in ‡ation persistence in the two sectors, the sources of shocks, or the need to use the input-output model. I …nd that, given the degrees of in ‡ation persistence in the two sectors, the type of regime that performs best is not a¤ected by the government's assumptions regarding in ‡ation persistence or the sources of shocks (when crafting the loss function). However, the type of regime that performs best is a¤ected by the incorrect use of a one-sector model.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 sets up the model and presents the linearized version used for later analysis. Section 3 discusses the calibration. Section 4 examines the qualitative characteristics of optimal policy under commitment for di¤erent degrees of in ‡ation persistence in the two sectors. Section 5 compares the performances of simple loss functions under the more realistic case of discretionary optimization. Section 6 examines some robustness properties of the discretionary regimes. Section 7 concludes.
2 Model of an Input-Output Economy Huang and Liu (2005) develop a New Keynesian model with a vertical production chain consisting of two sectors. Firms in the …rst sector produce …nal (nondurable) goods using intermediate goods and labor. Final goods are consumed by households. In the second sector, intermediate (nondurable) goods are produced using only labor. Intermediate goods are used only by …nal goods …rms in production. Each …rm in each sector produces a unique di¤erentiated good and engages in monopolistic competition within its sector. Prices in both sectors are sticky, and …rms adjust their prices in a staggered manner in the spirit of Calvo (1983) . There is one competitive market for homogenous labor that can be used by all …rms. All …rms are price takers in their input markets. Strum (2009) extends the model by introducing cost-push shocks and characterizing monetary policy as the minimization of an assigned loss function. This paper extends the model in Strum (2009) by assuming that in each sector and in each period, a fraction of …rms …nd that solving for the optimal forward-looking price is too costly. Following Galí and Gertler (1999) , Amato and Laubach (2003) , and Steinsson (2003) , I assume that backward-looking …rms in each sector employ a rule of thumb that uses past information to set a new price. This section presents the basic elements of the model and its linearized version used for subsequent analysis. 
Households
The economy is populated by a large number of identical, in…nitely lived households. Households derive utility from consumption and leisure. Given a …xed amount of time that households divide fully between leisure and labor each period, the household utility function can be written in terms of labor instead of leisure. Accordingly, households maximize expected lifetime utility, given by
where E 0 is the mathematical expectations operator given information available at time 0, 2 (0; 1)
is the subjective time discount factor, C t is consumption, and N t is labor hours.
The period utility function for consumption is u (C t ) = log (C t ). The consumption good, C t , is a composite of a continuum of di¤erentiated …nal goods in the spirit of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) ,
given by
where f t is the time-varying elasticity of substitution between the di¤erentiated …nal goods, y f t (i)
for i 2 [0; 1], and is assumed to always be greater than 1. Movements in f t can represent changes in household preferences or the business environment. The period disutility function for labor, v (N t ), is linear and increasing in labor hours. Without loss of generality, labor hours are normalized so that N t 2 [0; 1].
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Households have equal ownership in all …rms and divide all pro…ts equally among themselves.
Labor is homogeneous and supplied equally by households to all …rms through one market with one wage rate, which households take as given. I assume complete …nancial markets. Finally, I
assume standard budget-set and transversality conditions hold.
Final Goods
Each …nal goods …rm i has access to a constant returns to scale (CRS) Cobb-Douglas production function 
where mt > 1 is the time-varying elasticity of substitution between di¤erentiated intermediate goods, and y mt (i; j) is the amount of di¤erentiated intermediate good j demanded by …rm i.
Variations in mt can be seen as technology shocks (the ease with which …rms are able to substitute di¤erentiated intermediate goods for one another) or as shocks to the business environment (such as changes to the monopoly power enjoyed by individual …rms).
Each …rm minimizes costs to meet the demand for its good given its stated price. Final goods …rms adjust their prices with probability 1 f each period, where f 2 (0; 1). A random fraction 1 f of …rms resetting prices …nd it worthwhile to determine the price that maximizes discounted expected pro…ts over the time the price is expected to persist, where f 2 [0; 1). This maximization problem is given by
where f is a subsidy to …nal goods producers, V f s (i) is the nominal marginal cost of production in period s, D t;s is the stochastic discount factor for nominal payments between periods t and s (determined in the household maximization problem), and y (2003) suggests a generalization of the Galí and Gertler (1999) approach by allowing …rms to also react to an indicator of the previous period's output gap. Generalizing the rule of thumb in Steinsson (2003) , I assume that the backward-looking …rms set prices according to
where f;t 1 = P f;t 1 =P f;t 2 ; V f;t 1 denotes the nominal marginal cost of …nal goods at time t 1; the superscript n denotes the values in an e¢ cient equilibrium; f 0; and P f;t 1 denotes an index of prices newly set at time t 1, given by
Galí and Gertler (1999) formulate a rule similar to the one above, except they e¤ectively set f = 0.
Taking the log of (6) yields the rule log P b f t = log P f;t 1 + f;t 1 + fṽf;t 1 ;
where f;t 1 = log f;t 1 andṽ f;t 1 = log
In the steady state, this pricing rule is consistent with the steady-state price of all …rms in the sector.
The aggregate price level can be written as
Intermediate Goods
Each intermediate goods …rm j has access to a CRS production function given by
where A mt is a sectoral labor-augmenting technology factor, and N mt (j) is the amount of homogeneous labor used by …rm j. 
, (7), (8), and (9).
Government
The government serves two purposes in this model. First, it assigns a loss function to an independent central bank. The central bank acts to minimize its assigned loss function. I assume that the central bank can react to and a¤ect state variables in the current period. Second, the government collects lump-sum taxes from households to provide subsidies to …rms so that the steady-state equilibrium is not distorted from ine¢ ciencies arising from monopolistic competition. Finally, I
ignore the possible interactions between monetary and …scal policy that would be present in a richer model.
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Linearized Model
I log-linearize the model using log-deviations from a hypothetical non-distorted e¢ cient equilibrium (the equilibrium that would obtain if prices were ‡exible and there were no shocks to the elasticities of substitution).
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The natural rate of interest is the real interest rate that would obtain in the e¢ cient equilibrium. I list the key variables and symbols from the model in Table 1 .
relative price of intermediate goods in terms of …nal goods:
log-deviation of sticky-equilibrium relative price from steady statê q t log-deviation of e¢ cient-equilibrium relative price from steady statẽ q t relative price gap:q t q t q t c t output gap (sticky relative to e¢ cient level) { t log-deviation of gross nominal interest rate from steady state (log
log-deviation of gross natural real interest rate from steady statê a kt log-deviation of the technology factor from steady state in sector k The household intertemporal consumption equation is obtained from the household's …rst-order conditions. Its log-linearized version is given bỹ
I interpretc t as the output gap since only households purchase …nal goods.
The log-linearized pricing equations for backward-looking …rms can be combined with the loglinearized …rst-order equations for forward-looking …rms to obtain Phillips curves for each sector, namely,
where, for k 2 ff; mg,
As noted in Section 2, though k is allowed to be zero, k > 0 and k > 1; therefore, none of the denominators can be zero. The term 'q t + (1 ') c t is equivalent to the real marginal cost gap for …nal goods producers, while c t q t is equivalent to the real marginal cost gap for intermediate 
where kt an i.i.d. white noise process that is uncorrelated with all other stochastic variables (with variance normalized to 1), and uk ( k ) is decreasing in k . In this setup, I refer to kt as the cost-push shock in sector k.
As noted in Table 1 , the "relative price" refers to the ratio of the price index for intermediate goods to the price index for …nal goods. The relative price gap evolves, by de…nition, according tõ
I assume that the technology factors are stationary-that is, j k j < 1 for k 2 ff; mg-and evolve according toâ
where, for sector k,â kt is the log-deviation of the technology factor from steady state; k;t+1 , the productivity shock, is an i.i.d. white noise process uncorrelated with all other stochastic variables (with a variance of 1); ak is a constant used to calibrate the variance of the shock to the technology factor; and k is the autoregressive coe¢ cient. (11) to determine the interest rates that are consistent with the desired equilibrium. I compute price levels using the identity p k;t+1 p kt + k;t+1 for k 2 ff; mg, where p kt can be interpreted as the log-deviation in the price level from its initial value. I represent the structural equations of the economy as 2 6 4 X t+1
where X t = 2 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 4 .
The matrices A; B; C; and H are given in the appendix.
Household Loss Function
The second-order Taylor approximation to the household's utility function is given by
where C is the steady-state level of consumption, "t.i.p." is a collection of terms independent of policy, and O k k 3 is a collection of third-order and higher-order terms. The period loss function is given by
with coe¢ cients
where kt kt k;t 1 . This derivation is technically correct as long as f , m , f , and m are not equal to 1, which was assumed in Section 2. In ‡ation in each sector corresponds to lower household utility since the interaction of sticky prices and in ‡ation produces a set of suboptimal relative prices of di¤erentiated goods, which then 8 The derivation is given in a technical appendix that is available upon request. A value of 1 for f , m, f , or m would mean dividing by 0. These parameters equal 1 only if price setters never update their prices or are all backward-looking; these cases are not analyzed in this paper.
leads to ine¢ cient mixes of goods in each sector. In the loss function, the real marginal cost gap in the intermediate goods sector is connected to the relative price's role in the allocation of resources across sectors. Finally, as is standard in other models, deviations of consumption (…nal output) from the e¢ cient level correspond to higher utility losses.
In order to understand the connection between the household loss function and the proportion of backward-looking price setters, I present the loss function weights for a number of combinations of forward-looking and backward-looking price setters in Table 2 . The calibration of the model determining these weights is explained in Section 3. The main e¤ect of backward-looking price setters is a dramatic increase in the importance of smoothing the change of in ‡ation, represented by A 4 and A 5 : 
Calibration of the Model
This section discusses the calibration used for the benchmark model. The assumption that u (C t ) = log (C t ) implies that = 1. I set the subjective time discount factor to = 0:99, implying that the annual real interest rate in the steady state is about 4 percent, given that I interpret a time period as a quarter. The steady-state values of the elasticities of substitution for the di¤erentiated goods, f and m , are set to 10, which implies a steady-state markup of about 11 percent. Consistent with earlier empirical work (e.g., Carlton, 1986; and Blinder et al., 1998) and following Huang and Liu Technology shocks are typically represented as small but persistent (see, for example, Cooley and Prescott, 1995, and Gomme and Rupert, 2007) . I set the AR(1) coe¢ cients for process governing the evolution of the technology factors to f = m = 0:95. I set the standard deviation of the innovations to the technology factor process in each sector, ak , to 0:02.
As noted earlier, I assume that the cost-push shocks are white noise processes that do not depend on k . I set uk ( k ) so that the standard deviation of u kt is 0:004 in the purely forward-looking case. I chose this value so that a negative two-standard-deviation shock does not cause the central bank to hit the zero bound on the nominal interest rate when implementing optimal policy with commitment. 9 When k > 0, I use the expressions for u kt derived earlier to adjust uk ( k ).
As I am not aware of any models with estimates of k , I set these values so that the coe¢ cient on lagged marginal cost in the backward-looking rule of thumb equals that of the coe¢ cient on current marginal cost in the Phillips curves in which there are no backward-looking price setters (similar to the approach in Steinsson, 2003) . This leads me to set f = m = 0:086.
A number of authors have …t empirical estimates to hybrid Phillips curves. Fuhrer (1997) …nds that setting more relative weight on lagged in ‡ation does better, whereas Galí and Gertler (1999) …nd that more weight should be put on the forward-looking term. I take a middle-of-the-road approach and set f = 0:7, implying In this section, I assume that the central bank is assigned the household loss function. Furthermore, I assume that the central bank can credibly commit to state-contingent future actions. The intertemporal loss function of the central bank is given by
Without loss of generality, I have multiplied the household loss function by (1 ), divided out the leading coe¢ cient u c C C, and brought the coe¢ cient 1=2 into the period loss function. 10 In state-space form, the period loss function is given by
where 
The matrices D and s are given in the appendix. To obtain its state-contingent policy plan, the central bank solves the Lagrangian I have used the law of iterated expectations to write the Lagrangian more compactly. The initial conditions of X t are given and equal to X 0 . I have written the vector of Lagrangian multipliers relating to the non-predetermined variables as 0 t to emphasize that these variables depend on information available at time t.
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The results in Section 2 show that in ‡ation persistence a¤ects the model in three ways that matter for policymakers: First, higher in ‡ation persistence in a particular sector causes the household utility function to put more weight on smoothing in ‡ation in that sector. Second, for the calibrations considered in this paper, a higher degree of sectoral in ‡ation persistence leads to a ‡atter sectoral Phillips curve with respect to the output gap. 12 Third, higher sectoral in ‡ation persistence means that policymakers must work against a greater degree of momentum when attempting to a¤ect sectoral in ‡ation.
How do these additional complications arising from in ‡ation persistence a¤ect optimal policy under commitment? Figure 1 presents the optimal commitment responses to positive shocks under di¤erent combinations of sectoral in ‡ation persistence. The standard forward-looking case 1 1 The solution procedure is given in a technical appendix that is available on request. See Söderlind (1999) for a good exposition on the techniques used for problems of this kind.
1 2 This is true as long as k 3 > 0. As noted earlier, given values for k , , and k , su¢ ciently large values of k can cause k 3 to be negative, in which case the magnitude of the coe¢ cient of the output gap would be increasing in k . For all of the calibrations considered in this paper, is high in both sectors, the central bank also delays its maximal response relative to the forwardlooking case; however, unlike the case of unequal in ‡ation persistence, the maximal response is of lesser magnitude than in the forward-looking case. Finally, the bottom two rows show that when a sector is populated by a large number of backward-looking price setters, in ‡ation (or de ‡ation)
in that sector has a delayed and muted maximal response to a productivity shock in either sector.
The third and fourth columns of Figure 1 show the dynamics following positive one-standarddeviation cost-push shocks. The simulations show that, unlike the case with productivity shocks, the central bank engages in contractionary policy when responding to positive cost-push shocks in either sector. On the other hand, just as is the case with productivity shocks, the nature of the response does not depend on the degrees of in ‡ation persistence in the two sectors.
The timing of the central bank's maximal response to a cost-push shock does not depend on the degrees of in ‡ation persistence in the two sectors; however, the magnitude does. The maximal response comes in the initial period whether or not in ‡ation is persistent. The magnitude of the central bank's response to a cost-push shock is strongly a¤ected by the attenuation of the e¤ect of 20 cost-push shocks on sectoral in ‡ation that occurs as the percentage of backward-looking …rms in a sector increases. Accordingly, the magnitude of the central bank's maximal response to a cost-push shock decreases noticeably relative to the forward-looking case if in ‡ation persistence is high in the sector hit by the shock. Finally, as the bottom two rows show, when a sector is characterized by high in ‡ation persistence, the magnitude of the initial jump in in ‡ation (or de ‡ation) in that sector following a cost-push shock in either sector is lower than in the forward-looking case. 
Discretionary Policy Regimes
Although an analysis of the optimal commitment policy is useful for understanding the characteristics of desirable policy, Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1999) In a forward-looking model, Strum (2009) …nds that targeting in ‡ation or price levels in both sectors dominates single-sector targeting regimes; therefore, I consider only regimes that target in ‡ation or price levels in both sectors.
I represent these regimes by loss functions given by
The government sets the weights f , m , and c in each regime. The weights must be calculated with care since arbitrarily chosen weights in loss functions may a¤ect the ranking of the regimes.
To address this problem, I use numerical methods to …nd the set of weights for each policy regime that yields the minimum household loss for that regime type, subject to the constraint that each coe¢ cient be nonnegative. 14 1 3 In ‡ation targeting is of particular interest since di¤erent forms of it are pursued by central banks around the world. See Bernanke et al., 1999 , for a good discussion.
1 4 The numerical method used to …nd the optimal weights starts with an initial guess of weights and then examines how the household losses change as a function of the joint set of weights. The candidate optimal set of weights for each regime was found by following the decreasing household losses as a function of the set of weights to a minimum. To check the result, I employed a simulated annealing technique given in Yang et al. (2005) .
One disadvantage of the backward-looking rule is that optimizing agents might not use the same backward-looking rule in di¤erent regimes. Nevertheless, two factors suggest that the approach in this paper is useful. First, although di¤erent regimes lead to di¤erent short-run dynamics of in ‡ation, all of the regimes are consistent with the same steady-state in ‡ation rate of zero. Second, …rms do not adopt the rule to optimize or as a long-term rule, but rather at random times when information costs are high. Therefore, the backward-looking rule can be seen as a simple rule employed by …rms when they occasionally …nd the costs of information gathering and processing prohibitively expensive.
The central bank's problem can be put in a standard linear-quadratic setup.
15 I calculate and report the expected household losses under each loss function as
where C is the quarterly steady-state value of consumption (…nal goods output) and E L regime is the expected discounted sum of household losses minus the losses that would occur in the e¢ cient ‡exible-price equilibrium.
16 Table 3 reports the coe¢ cients and expected household losses for each regime according to the percentages of backward-looking …rms (and, hence, degrees of in ‡ation persistence) in the two sectors. 17 Two observations jump out immediately. First, the absolute levels of losses are highest in the fully forward-looking model and lowest in the model with high persistence in both sectors.
When the percentage of backward-looking price setters is high, the attenuation of the e¤ects of cost-push shocks in the sectoral Phillips becomes important. Second, even though there is always a clear ranking of regime performance, the di¤erence between the best and worst regimes decreases as in ‡ation persistence increases. The qualitative results are summarized in Table 4 . Consistent with Strum (2009) In the previous section, the government crafted loss functions based on an accurate assessment of in ‡ation persistence, the sources of shocks to the economy, and the model of the economy to be used. However, monetary policy may not be practiced in such favorable conditions. In this section, I examine how discretionary regimes perform when the central bank minimizes loss functions that were crafted based on assumptions that may not be true.
The Degrees of In ‡ation Persistence
I begin by examining how policies crafted under incorrect assumptions about in ‡ation persistence perform. Speci…cally, I follow a two-step process: First, I assume that the government chooses loss function coe¢ cients based on assumptions regarding in ‡ation persistence in each sector that may not be accurate. Second, I determine the household losses that occur when the central bank implements these policies in the true economy. Table 5 
The Sources of Shocks
Next, I examine regime performance when the loss function is based on the assumption that shocks hit either only the …nal goods sector or only the intermediate goods sector, when, in fact, shocks hit both sectors. I assume that the government correctly perceives the degrees of in ‡ation persistence in both sectors when it sets the loss functions. I follow a two-step process similar to the one above: I calibrate loss function coe¢ cients that are optimal under the assumption that shocks hit only one of the sectors, then I run the implied policies in economies that are subject to shocks in both sectors. Table 6 When the one-sector regimes are incorrectly implemented in input-output economies, regime rankings from earlier exercises do not hold as tightly. In the forward-looking input-output economy, one-sector in ‡ation targeting performs best if a forward-looking model is assumed, whereas onesector price-level targeting performs best if in ‡ation persistence is assumed when crafting the loss functions.
18
If in ‡ation is persistent in at least one sector in the true input-output economy, one-sector in ‡ation targeting always performs best. 
Summary of Robustness Results
The three exercises in this section point to a few qualitative results about the robustness of loss functions that are formed under assumptions that may not be true of the economy in which they are implemented. Table 8 reports the best-performing regime for each characterization of the economy under the possibly incorrect assumptions studied in the previous three exercises and the best-performing regime when correct assumptions are used. The type of regime that performs best under di¤erent combinations of in ‡ation persistence is not a¤ected by the government's assumptions regarding in ‡ation persistence or the sources of shocks (when crafting the loss function).
In particular, if the economy is fully forward-looking, price-level targeting usually performs best.
When in ‡ation is persistent in one or both sectors, speed-limit targeting usually performs best.
However, the type of regime that performs best is a¤ected by the incorrect use of a one-sector model. In this case, in ‡ation targeting performs best in one of the two forward-looking cases and in every case when in ‡ation in the true economy is persistent in one or both sectors. When the central bank acts under discretion, the type of regime that performs best depends on the degrees of in ‡ation persistence in both sectors. As in Strum (2009) , price-level targeting performs best when both sectors are fully forward-looking. Speed-limit targeting performs best when in ‡ation persistence is high in the …nal goods sector but low in the intermediate goods sector.
In this case, both speed-limit targeting and price-level targeting outperform in ‡ation targeting.
When in ‡ation persistence is high in both sectors, speed-limit targeting still performs best; however, in this case, in ‡ation targeting outperforms price-level targeting.
When crafting the loss function to assign to the central bank, incorrect assumptions can be made about the degree of in ‡ation persistence, the sources of shocks, or whether to use a one-sector 30 model. Under the calibration considered here, the type of regime that performs best under di¤erent combinations of in ‡ation persistence is not a¤ected by the government's assumptions regarding in ‡ation persistence or the sources of shocks (when crafting the loss function). However, the type of regime that performs best is a¤ected by the incorrect use of a one-sector model.
Finally, in assessing these results, it is important to remember that the mechanism generating in ‡ation persistence in the model may be important. Further research into the sources of in ‡ation persistence would enable clearer connections between the design of policy in a model and in the real world. Nevertheless, this paper has shown that accounting for both sticky prices and in ‡ation persistence at di¤erent stages of production can be important for sticky-price models used to study monetary policy. In ‡ation dynamics and policy trade-o¤s can depend on the degrees of in ‡ation persistence at multiple stages of production.
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